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As expected, the MPC revised upwards its GDP growth forecasts and predicted a return of the
unemployment rate to the 7% threshold 18 months earlier than it previously thought. Costas Milas
argues that despite the rising economic optimism and better economic data, unemployment might
still take until the second quarter of 2016 to return to 7%.
In August 2013, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) announced its brand new
forward guidance policy. The MPC pledged to leave its policy interest rate unchanged (at 0.5%) and
support the economy with quantitative easing (QE) at least until the unemployment rate returned
from its current 7.7% level to 7% (which, the August inflation report, predicted to happen with a 55% probability only
in the third quarter of 2016). Forward guidance would cease to hold if any of the following three “knockouts” were
breached: (a) inflation forecasts (18 to 24 months ahead) turned out to be 0.5 percentage points or more above the
2% target; (b) medium-term inflation expectations no longer remained sufficiently well anchored; and (c) the
currently loose monetary policy posed a risk to financial stability.
At the same time, the MPC was quick to emphasise that a return to the 7% unemployment rate threshold would not
automatically trigger a tightening in monetary policy. Indeed, at 7%, the MPC would start thinking about a tightening
in policy rather than pressing the “tightening button”. Since August, however, economic performance has surprised
positively.  Consequently, the MPC members are now revising downwards their unemployment rate forecasts. Back
in August, the MPC’s average unemployment forecast was for the unemployment rate to remain above 7% at least
until the third quarter of 2016. Will the MPC now predict a return to the 7% threshold much earlier than 2016q3.  To
answer this, Figure 1 plots the MPC’s mean unemployment rate forecasts (based on the August 2013 Inflation
Report).
Figure 1: Unemployment rate forecasts, 2013-2016:
Note: Okun law forecasts are based on the following empirical model:
u(t)-u(t-1)=0.12-0.07*growth(t)+0.05*uncertainty(t), where u(t) is the unemployment rate, growth(t) is GDP growth
and uncertainty(t) is GDP growth uncertainty generated by an AR(1) model of GDP growth with a GARCH(1,1)
component. Adjusted R2=0.52; t-ratio on growth(t)=-10.3;  t-ratio on uncertainty(t)=2.6.
It is not quite clear to me which empirical model (and what type of collective judgement) the MPC members relied on
to produce their forecasts. This is not a criticism. To understand their thinking, I run a simple “Okun law” model
which estimates changes in the UK unemployment rate as a function of UK GDP growth (based on historical data
over the 1970q1-2013q3 period) augmented by a GARCH-type measure of GDP growth uncertainty  The idea is that
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changes in unemployment rate are negatively related to economic growth and positively related to economic
uncertainty. The model uses as inputs the MPC’s mean GDP growth forecasts (see Figure 2) to produce
unemployment rate forecasts up until 2016q3.
Figure 2: Alternative GDP growth forecasts
Using the MPC’s mean GDP growth forecasts, a revised set of unemployment rate forecasts are reported back in
Figure 1 (labelled “Okun law forecasts”).  Clearly, MPC’s unemployment rate forecasts provide a rosier economic
picture since they are lower than those produced by the simple Okun law (which also relies on the MPC’s GDP
growth forecasts!).  With this in mind, two tentative conclusions emerge:
1. The MPC has established a superior model which beats the simple Okun law.  This is definitely a possibility.
 It will be nice, however, to know the details of their model.  In any case, one might argue that since the MPC’s
remit involves targeting a 2% CPI inflation rate, it makes sense for the MPC to produce more accurate CPI
inflation rate (than GDP growth or unemployment rate) forecasts!
2. If, instead, the Okun law is sufficiently “correct”, one can conclude that the MPC’s GDP growth forecasts are
not quite compatible with their own unemployment rate forecasts. This is because the “correct” Okun law
relies on the MPC’s GDP growth forecasts to predict a pattern of unemployment which is not “similar” to the
MPC’s own forecasts.  Notice also that I tried a much more sophisticated regime-switching Okun law model in
which unemployment is allowed to respond differently to “booms” and “busts”.  This model also failed to
match the MPC’s unemployment rate forecasts.  Other economic models (and pooling information from
different models) are also possible to be estimated; this is on-going research (see, for example, work by
myself and colleagues in the International Journal of Forecasting)
So, when should we expect the unemployment rate to return to the 7% threshold?  The Okun law suggests NOT
before 2016q3.  However, the MPC is currently revising upwards its GDP growth forecasts and downwards its
unemployment rate forecasts.  With this in mind, I will assume two different possibilities: (a) the MPC lifts all its
mean GDP growth forecasts by 0.5% and (b) the MPC lifts all its mean GDP growth forecasts by 0.75%; see Figure
2. Then, I rerun the Okun model with these more generous GDP growth forecasts as inputs.  Turning back to Figure
1, one can notice that the unemployment rate will return to the 7% threshold in 2016q2 if, and only if, all GDP growth
forecasts are simultaneously lifted up by 0.75%. To conclude:
1. Despite the recent positive economic news, it is rather premature to expect that unemployment will return to
7% earlier than 2016.
2. Therefore, despite the rising optimism about the economy and the emerging worries of tightening monetary
policy as early as 2015, borrowers can be “reasonably confident” that the policy rate will stay at its historically
low level at least until 2016 q2.  This, as long as none of the three “knockouts” are breached. Obviously, the
MPC can produce a new set of very strong GDP growth forecasts (much stronger than those reported in
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Figure 2.). This latest scenario would definitely suggest a much quicker return of the unemployment rate to
7%.  Such a scenario, however, would seem rather questionable: how much would you trust a forecaster
who, in the space of three months only, would be willing to make a complete U-turn in its forecasting
judgement?
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the
London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting. 
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